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The Corporate Social Responsibility Movement and Law’s Empire: Is there a 
Conflict? 
 
Professor Irene Lynch Fannon, Faculty and Department of Law, University College Cork. 
 
Abstract. 
At the heart of corporate governance and social responsibility discourse is recognition of the fact that 
the modern corporation is primarily governed by the profit maximisation imperative coupled with moral and 
ethical concerns that such a limited imperative drives the actions of large and wealthy corporations which have 
the ability to act in influential and significant ways, shaping how our social world is experienced. The actions of 
the corporation and its management will have a wide sphere of impact over all of its stakeholders whether these 
are employees, shareholders, consumers or the community in which the corporation is located. As globalisation 
has become central to the way we think it is also clear that ‘community’ has an ever expanding meaning which 
may include workers and communities living very far away from Corporate HQ. In recent years academic 
commentators have become increasingly concerned about the emphasis on what can be called short-term profit 
maximisation and the perception that this extremist interpretation of the profit imperative results in morally and 
ethically unacceptable outcomes.1 Hence demands for more corporate social responsibility.   
Following Cadbury’s2 classification of corporate social responsibility into three distinct areas, this paper will 
argue that once the legally regulated tier is left aside corporate responsibility can become so nebulous as to be 
relatively meaningless. The argument is not that corporations should not be required to act in socially 
responsible ways but that unless supported by regulation, which either demands high standards, or at the very 
least incentivises the attainment of such standards such initiatives are doomed to failure. The paper will 
illustrate by reference to various chosen cases that law’s discourse has already signposted ways to consider and 
resolve corporate governance problems in the broader social responsibility context.3  It will also illustrate how 
corporate responsibility can and must be supported by legal measures. Secondly, this paper will consider the 
potential conflict between an emphasis on corporate social responsibility and the regulatory approach.4 Finally, 
this paper will place the current interest in corporate social responsibility within the broader debate on the 
relationship between law and non-legally enforceable norms and will present some reflections on the norm 
debate arising from this consideration of the CSR movement. 
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Introduction 
 
At the heart of corporate governance and social responsibility discourse is recognition of the fact that 
the modern corporation is primarily governed by the profit maximisation imperative coupled with moral and 
ethical concerns that such a limited imperative drives the actions of large and wealthy corporations which have 
the ability to act in influential and significant ways, shaping how our social world is experienced. The actions of 
the corporation and its management will have a wide sphere of impact over all of its stakeholders whether these 
are employees, shareholders, consumers or the community in which the corporation is located. As globalisation 
has become central to the way we think it is also clear that ‘community’ has an ever expanding meaning which 
may include workers and communities living very far away from Corporate HQ. In recent years academic 
commentators have become increasingly concerned about the emphasis on what can be called short-term profit 
maximisation and the perception that this extremist interpretation of the profit imperative results in morally and 
ethically unacceptable outcomes.5 Hence demands for more corporate social responsibility.   
Following Cadbury’s6 classification of corporate social responsibility into three distinct areas, this paper will 
argue that once the legally regulated tier is left aside corporate responsibility becomes so nebulous as to be 
relatively meaningless. The argument is not that corporations should not be required to act in socially 
responsible ways but that unless supported by regulation, which either demands high standards, or at the very 
least incentivises the attainment of such standards such initiatives are doomed to failure. The paper will 
illustrate by reference to various chosen cases that law’s discourse has already signposted ways to consider and 
resolve corporate governance problems in the broader social responsibility context.7  Secondly, this paper will 
consider the potential conflict between an emphasis on corporate social responsibility and the regulatory 
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approach.8 Finally, this paper will consider the implications for the broader debate on the relationship between 
law and non-legally enforceable norms raised by this analysis of the corporate social responsibility movement.9 
 The paper is divided into three parts, the first will consider what we mean by corporate social 
responsibility. The second will consider some cases and materials within the legal domain which have illustrated 
that there has always been a clear understanding that corporations should and do act beyond a minimum level of 
legal compliance and that corporate law and theory clearly supports and understands this idea.  In particular over 
considerable periods of time chancery  courts on both sides of the Atlantic have resolved potential conflicts 
between shareholder primacy and welfare, or indeed its less attractive version, the shareholder wealth 
maximisation principle10 on the one hand and socially responsible actions on the other. The third part considers 
how the modern emphasis on corporate social responsibility fits with the more theoretical analysis regarding 
norms and behaviour generally and in doing so highlights some difficulties with the voluntary approach which 
are a source of concern, asking in particular how meaningful an emphasis on voluntary behaviour actually is. 
 
                                                 
8
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Part I: What is meant by CSR? 
 
From a lawyer’s perspective the current fashionable interest in CSR leads not to clear answers as to what is 
meant but to many questions about motivation, purpose and so on.  A number of large consulting firms have formed 
CSR units to advise their corporate clients on how to act in more socially responsible ways.  Justifications for CSR 
range from reputational benefits accruing to the company to financially beneficial outcomes.  However it is hard to 
escape the suspicion that sometimes and perhaps at best (because there may be more worrisome motivations, 
described below) corporate interest in overt CSR matters is a movement fitting more into the PR or image building 
side of things than hard core financial accounting.  What is puzzling about the CSR movement is what lies beneath 
this ‘new’ idea that a company should act in socially accountable and responsible ways.  In fact companies and their 
managers have always been accountable to the broader society in which they are placed and have always been not 
only required, but also, in many cases, positively motivated to act responsibly.  The idea is not new, but it is argued 
here that what is new about CSR is the attempt to move the forum of discourse about accountability and 
responsibility away from law’s empire11 or dominion.  The question raised in this article is why has this happened 
and what are the implications for regulation of corporate activities.  
 
CSR is normally considered as influencing the corporation’s actions in relation to the following areas of 
activity: The Workplace and Employee Relations; The Community in which the corporation is located; Supply Chain 
Management; Customer Relations;  Environmental concerns and Sustainable Development. 
Typically, in the corporate and accounting context, different CSR indices are measured such as input measures, for 
example staff turnover, absences and staff grievances and output measures such as staff satisfaction surveys, and 
perception measures for staff in the workplace area.  Community outputs measure employee voluntarism in the 
community and support for this.  Concern with suppliers could include as an input measurement the average creditor 
days, the number of successful legal actions taken and output could include quality of supply and of the supply 
chain..  This kind of CSR reporting is becoming an integral part of many businesses.12  
What is unclear about the classification of many of these initiatives as CSR initiatives is the relationship 
between these actions and actions which are legally required or which at the very least facilitate compliance with 
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 Dworkin, Ronald: Law’s Empire (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1988). 
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legal standards.  The articulation of the close connection is lacking within the CSR movement. In relation to the 
example provided above relating to creditors, any contract will provide for timely payment, any missed payment will 
trigger legal consequences 13so it is unclear how such compliant behaviour is classified as responsible in the same 
way as measures taken by the corporation to support voluntary activity within the community.  Similarly in the 
workplace much of what is given as examples in the CSR literature actually reflects the need to comply with legal 
standards or at the very least to show that the corporation is doing what it can to comply with legal standards.  Hill 
proffers the example of gender bias in the supermarket retail sector where there is a high proportion of women 
employed at lower levels compared with the proportion of women employed as managers. CSR, it is argued, can 
provide data on employment levels and on improvements to indicate the corporation is serious about being socially 
responsible.  In reality however, any corporation involved in the retail sector or indeed in any other sector where 
there is a gender imbalance between the lower grades of workers and the higher grades of workers would be advised 
to do this kind of data collection to protect themselves against potential litigation of the kind which occurred in the 
US between the EEOC and the department store chain Sears Roebuck.14 
CSR has benefited in recent times from the attention of the European Commission.  In considering the 
publications on this area emanating from the Directorate General of Employment and Social Affairs15 and other 
sections including the Directorate General for Enterprise and the Information Society, it is clear that the global 
context is extremely significant in relation to European style CSR.  The attempt to ensure socially responsible actions 
in supply chain management, movement of capital and other areas of corporate activity across the globe seems to be 
the main focus of the EU CSR documents.  The emphasis on labour rights and sustainable development in 
environmental terms is also very clear. 
                                                 
13
 Note that under s. 213(e) of the 1963 Companies Act, any creditor owed more than  x can petition the court for 
liquidation if demand letters are not met.  The time frame is surprisingly short as is the threshold amount owed which 
entitles any creditor to standing to petition to liquidate a company.  Of course the application of the short demand 
time is not reflected in practise, nevertheless it is surprising that compliance with payment of creditors would be 
considered to be a ‘socially responsible’ action rather than a legally required one. 
14
 EEOC v Sears, Roebuck & Co. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N. D. Ill 1986) (Sears II).   
15
 DG Employment and Social Affairs: Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility. July 2001.  This paper is based on COM (2001) 366 final. 
See also ABC Of  The Main Instruments Of  Corporate Social Responsibility, DG Employment And Social Affairs. 
2004, in particular pages 32-35 where Directives and other national legislative instruments in this area are listed. 
Both these documents can be down loaded from the EU website www.europa.eu.int. Accessed on October 4th, 2005. 
In addition the Multi-Stakeholder Forum established in 2004 has pursued and active agenda with a recent meeting 
and agenda setting exercise in December 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/csr/forum_2006_index.htm. 
 Accessed January 14th 2007. 
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“Within the company, socially responsible practises primarily involve employees and relate to issues such as 
investing in human capital, health and safety and managing change, while environmentally responsible practices 
relate mainly to the management of natural resources used in production.”16  
 
Management of industrial change is also a key issue. 
“Recent high-profile announcements of large-scale redundancies have put the spotlight on the way firms interact 
with their employees in such situations, and management of change is one of the key aspects of corporate social 
responsibility that the Green Paper discusses.”17   
 
As a policy initiative at EU level the emphasis on CSR is also tied in with the objectives of the Lisbon 
Agenda initiated in  2000 and revised at its mid-term point in 2005. Questions must be asked about the success of 
these initiatives at this point in time when the Lisbon Agenda itself is acknowledged to be in serious difficulties.18 
This document notes the difference between legal compliance  and voluntary socially responsible actions and 
encourages companies to ‘go beyond compliance’ noting that there is a relationship between proactive actions and 
improved competitiveness, an assertion that is not proved by the document.  However importantly it is noted that  
“Corporate Social responsibility should nevertheless not be seen as a substitute to regulation or legislation 
concerning social rights and environmental standards, including the development of new appropriate legislation.  In 
countries where such regulations do not exist efforts should focus on putting the proper regulatory or legislative 
framework in place in order to define a level playing field on the basis of which socially responsible actions can be 
developed.”19 
 
 
CSR has also caught the populist imagination and is very much seen as the way forward by those interested in issues 
ranging from the perceived threat of globalisation, exploitation of workers and communities in developing 
economies, to protection of the supply chain for many consumable goods including food products such as coffee etc.  
Although areas of concern can thus range from companies acting nicely in their own neighbourhood to companies 
acting generously across the globe, it is even more difficult to pin down exactly the nature of the focus of the CSR20 
                                                 
16
 ABC Of  The Main Instruments Of  Corporate Social Responsibility, DG Employment And Social Affairs. 
2004,Para. 2:1 forward. 
17
 Press release from DG Employment and Social Affairs and DG Enterprise and Information Society on launch of 
Green Paper. 
 
 
18
 See further COM (2005) 24 /final Working Together For Growth And Jobs: A New Start For The Lisbon Strategy: 
Communication from President Barroso in agreement with the Vice-President Verheugen. COM (2005) 330 final 
entitled Common Actions for Growth and Employment: The Community Lisbon Programme. 
19
 Supra n. 16. Para 2. 
20
 World Bank Report: ‘Strengthening implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Supply Chain’, 
2003. The difficulties of establishing the truth which lies between real working conditions and reported working 
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movement.  It is clear that it is concerned with behaviour which it views as beyond mere compliance with regulatory 
norms.  But as we have seen many of the proponents of CSR are not clear about the role of law in this endeavour, nor 
is it clearly acknowledged within CSR discourse that many types of behaviour which are considered responsible are 
also legally required.  (The law is no stranger to responsibility!) Many within the CSR movement are also not clear 
as to whether these voluntary responsible corporate actions are a precursor to legal regulation or whether 
encouraging such behaviour should be regarded as a substitute to legal regulation.  At least the EU documents are 
clear about this latter point and reiterate that CSR is not a substitute for regulation.  
 
 
“Some may see the rapid development of codes as a dangerous trend towards a ‘privatisation’ of social 
rights. 
Clearly, codes can only complement and not replace national and international legislation or social dialogue 
and collective bargaining.” 21 
 
 
A further point can be made regarding CSR which is very clear from EU documents and that is the importance of 
CSR in the context of globalisation. It is primarily in relation to developing countries that the EU seeks to extend the 
CSR influence, but here two preliminary critical points can be made.  Firstly, although addressing a global context, 
EU documents fail to recognise that most of the world’s regulatory environments in the area of labour rights and 
environmental standards are a lot more flexible than that of Europe.  Here we can distinguish between developed 
economies and others.  In the developed world, outside of the European Union, the United States, in the area of 
employment and labour rights presents an entirely different picture from Europe.22 Canada and Australia present 
broadly similar pictures to the European one, but Japanese employment structures seem to work on a voluntary rather 
than regulatory basis.23 In many other less developed countries the level of protections afforded to European workers 
                                                                                                                                                              
conditions is illustrated in many reports from organisations such as Fairtrade.  See www.fairtrade.org. See Chapter 3 
Time to Play Fair regarding abuses in the sportswear industry.  Even though corporate social responsibility 
movements can highlight the need to improve matters and abuses which take place, it is clear even from these kind of 
reports that there are aspirations to ensure that ILO labour standards are complied with, that governments in these 
countries comply by enacting legislation reflecting these standards and that in particular trade unions are permitted to 
act on behalf of indigenous workers.  This represents some challenges to companies seeking low-cost manufacturing 
locations. 
21
 Supra. N. 16 Para 1.3 
22
 Lynch-Fannon, I:  Working Within Two Kinds of Capitalism.  (Hart Publications, Oxford, 2003). Freeman, Richard 
B:  Working Under Different Rules. (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1994).  Note that the EU ABC document 
supra n. 16 refers to transatlantic meetings on core labour standards in relation to improving work standards in 
developing countries. Supra. n. 16 p. 9.  P. 9.   
23
 Learmount S. Corporate Governance, What can be learned from Japan? (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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is unheard of, presenting therefore questions regarding the naivety of statements described in the Green Paper.  
Secondly, references are made to incorporation of ILO standards and other international standards without 
addressing whether this is practical in the short term or addressing the possibility that non-compliance with 
acceptable labour standards for example could be addressed closer to home. 
The distinctions made between legal regulation and CSR encapsulated in the idea that CSR goes beyond 
legal compliance and represents an investment in human capital and sustainability which may yield competitive 
benefits resonates with the more theoretical school of thought on corporate action, the school which explores the 
potential of non legally enforceable norms as a way of regulating corporate behaviour. Norms scholars who have 
turned to corporate governance matters, hypothesise that corporate law principles and rules are designed to facilitate 
behaviour which is largely governed by non legally enforceable norms and that in reality in many corporate 
governance systems NLERS play very significant role in governing corporate action. However, as we will see in the 
final section most norm scholarship is concerned with ‘maintream corporate governance’ in other words the 
relationship between the corporation, the management and the shareholders.  It does not in general address CSR 
issues, but this article will seek to place CSR within this paradigm.  For the moment however it is interesting to note 
that one of the most prominent US corporate governance scholars identified Scandinavian countries as possessing 
corporate governance systems where  NLERS play highly significant roles. Coffee hypothesises by that in very 
competitive countries such as the Scandinavian countries NLERs are important and goes on to make assertions 
regarding the relationship between regulation or lack of regulation and competitiveness which are unfortunately 
unsupported by the evidence.  Nevertheless the identification of reference to norms within the Scandinavian 
experience is not misplaced and indeed this would seem to reflect the European experience where it is acknowledged 
that the influence of Scandinavian thinking on competitiveness matters has influenced further development of the 
European Social model of corporate governance.24  
Conclusion 
In conclusion of this part, a definition of CSR therefore can immediately clarify that CSR is focussed on 
non legally regulated behaviour.  It seems to be by and large focussed also with concerns regarding non shareholding 
                                                 
24
 For a description of the Scandinavian influence on the development of the Social Policy see further Lynch-Fannon, 
I:  “ The European Social Model of Corporate Governance: Prospects for Success in an Enlarged Europe” in Ali et 
al: P.Ali and G. Gregoriou (Eds.) International Corporate Governance after Sarbanes-Oxley (John Wiley & Sons: 
New Jersey, 2006), pp.423-443. 
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stakeholders, such as communities, in particular global communities, workers, environment, consumers and so forth.  
Central to our understanding of CSR,  both in terms of what it is and what it is not, is a clear articulation of it 
relationship to legally enforced standards.  Unfortunately this question seems to generate a number of different 
approaches.  CSR is seen by some as a step towards standards which will eventually be regulated.  This is where we 
could regard the EU approach in a general sense. 25 Others see CSR as perhaps an anitidote to over-regulation.  It is 
possible that the majority of those currently writing as norm scholars within corporate law scholarship are in this 
camp. Others see CSR as providing a feel-good factor in relation to how our corporations act in the world, this seems 
to have caught the populist imagination but also has caught the imagination of our marketing gurus.  Unfortunately 
                                                 
25
 Some of the major steps in the EU approach to CSR matters are described chronologically below.  The approach 
is characterised by a willingness to take steps in converting voluntary corporate action into matters of public record 
through accounting disclosure. Measurement and accountability thus become integral to CSR actions, converting 
purely private voluntary corporate action to a matter of public record and dialogue.   
On 27 October 2004, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a Directive concerning annual 
accounts. This Directive proposal (COM(2004) 725) indicates that EU-based listed companies must disclose 
an annual corporate governance statement as part of their annual report. The Directive also indicates 
that within their corporate governance statement and where relevant, companies may also provide an analysis 
of environmental and social aspects necessary to understand their development, performance and position. 
While not mandating reporting on CSR issues, the Directive recognizes the relevance of environmental 
and social issues in the context of corporate governance. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/accounting/otherdocs_en.htm 
  
In its communication entitled ‘Corporate social responsibility: a business contribution to sustainable 
development’, COM(2002) 347, the Commission invited the European Multistakeholder Forum 
on CSR to develop commonly agreed guidelines and criteria for measurement, reporting and assurance by 
mid-2004. The CSR Forum presented the Commission a final report with its conclusions on 30 June 2004. 
 
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/empl/csr_eu_multi_stakeholder_forum/info/data/en/CSR%20Forum%20fin 
al%20report.pdf .   
The Forum has pursued a relatively active agenda and its latest meetings in December have been referred to above. 
Supra n. 15. 
 In its Report On The Commission Green Paper on promoting a European framework for corporate 
social responsibility, the European Parliament has invited the Commission to bring forward a proposal on 
the appropriate directive (the fourth company law directive) for social and environmental reporting to be 
include alongside financial reporting requirements(6). 
In its Communication On The EU Strategy For Sustainable Development, COM(2001) 264, the 
Commission invited all publicly quoted companies with at least 500 staff to publish a ‘triple bottom line’ in 
their annual reports to shareholders that measures their performance against economic, environmental and 
social criteria. 
In 1998, the High-Level Group on Economic and Social Implications of Industrial Change 
set-up at the invitation of the European Council, invited companies of more than 1 000 employees to publish 
voluntarily a ‘Managing change report’, i.e. an annual report on employment and working conditions (e.g. 
employee consultation and social dialogue, education and training, health and safety, equal opportunities) to 
be developed in consultation with employees and their representatives in accordance with national traditions. 
See further ABC of the main instruments of Corporate Social Responsibility referred to at supra n. 16.  
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the latter two statements resonate with cynicism to which the author readily admits, but it is hard to see how from a 
lawyer’s perspective this approach has any other meaning. However, on a more positive note, it is acknowledged that 
it is important not to be totally dismissive particularly when one considers the good work of lobby groups such as the 
Fairtrade movement and in the US the Domini group www.domini.com which has been active as a socially 
responsible funds investor in the retail clothing sector. It is important to try to focus on the question of what CSR can 
deliver that law is not delivering and to consider how both can compliment each other rather than compete.  
Part II: The Courts and the Legislature. 
This section seeks to provide the reader with some illustration of how the legal regulation of companies will 
find a place for CSR.  Legal regulation will include judicial statements in decided cases and statutory material.  The 
section also aims to clearly articulate the legal basis and theory underlying the limited liability corporation and to 
identify a proper role for voluntary behaviour aimed at non shareholder, stakeholder welfare.  
The chancery courts have always considered managerial activity in an expansive way.  There has always 
been room for what is now described by some as CSR ever since Lord Hutton recognised that “The law does not say 
that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of 
the company….”26  It is of course important that generosity and responsible action within the paradigm of company 
law must be linked to the overall prosperity of the company and this is equally true in modern discourse on CSR 
where different kinds of justifications for adoption of CSR policies are inevitably linked to corporate benefit.  It may 
sound harsh to point this out but in reality both legally and theoretically it would be unacceptable to propose any 
thing else.  In other words it would be unacceptable to present the corporation as a vehicle for achieving any sort of 
broad based social goods which were not referred back to the primary function of the corporation, to make money 
and profits for its shareholders. The argument here is that corporate law has already understood this.  Many cases 
grapple with this balancing act.  The famous US case of Shlensky v Wrigley27 which involved a shareholder action 
alleging that the directors and in particular the defendant were delinquent in not installing lights to facilitate night 
games of baseball recognised that the directors of a company who exercise the legitimately delegated power of the 
shareholders will not be subject to the control of the courts over decisions which are discretionary in nature as to the 
direction of the business.  This is the case even if other decisions may be demonstrably wiser or may render the 
business more successful or profitable. The plaintiff had alleged that the directors were dominated by the defendant 
                                                 
26
 Hutton v West Cork Rwy Co. (1883) 23 Ch. D. 654, 672. 
27
 Shlensky v Wrigley et al 95 Ill. App. 2d 173; 237 N.E. 2d 776; 1968 Ill. App. LEXIS 1107. 
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majority shareholder’s view that baseball was a ‘daytime sport’ and that installing lights would affect the character of 
the surrounding neighbourhood. The court speculated that perhaps a long term view of the value of the property 
might have motivated this refusal but more importantly emphasised that the court’s role was not to second guess 
management decisions: “Directors are elected for their business capabilities and judgment and the courts cannot 
require them to forego their judgement because of the decisions of directors of other companies.  The court reiterated 
that for it to decide that a decision of the directors was a correct one is “beyond its jurisdiction and ability. We are 
merely saying that the decision is one properly before the directors and the motives alleged in the amended 
complaint showed no fraud, illegality or conflict of interest in their making of that decision.”28  Similarly on this side 
of the Atlantic, in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd.29 the court stated that it will “necessarily give credit to 
the bona fide opinion of the directors, if such is found to exist, and will respect their judgment as to matters of 
management; having done this, the ultimate conclusion has to be as to the side of a fairly broad line on which the 
case falls.”  On the other hand in Dodge v Ford Motor Co.30 the court was of the view that the socially altruistic 
desire of Henry Ford to invest all company profits in making the cheapest cars to make cars generally available to the 
American public and to generate more quality jobs in the community had to be balanced fairly against the interests of 
the shareholders who sought some distribution of the profits as dividends.  The court expressed the view that the re-
investment of all profits  was “not only far from related to the good of stockholders, but amounted to a change in the 
ends of the corporation and that this was not a purpose contemplated or allowed by the corporate charter.”  
Accordingly, the plaintiff who owned 10% of the stock in the Ford Motor Co. successfully obtained an order that 
some of the corporate profits would be paid in dividends, but was unsuccessful in enjoining the company from 
further expansion as the court was of the view that it could not interfere with the decision of the directors to expand 
the business, stating that ‘The judges are not business experts.’31  
Many cases illustrate quite clearly the understanding that altruistic and responsible behaviour can benefit the 
company and its shareholders, but on the other hand the Ford Motor Case illustrates that the courts are also mindful 
of the basic tenets of company law and corporate law theory, namely that the company is ultimately there for the 
benefit of its shareholders and other goals can only be pursued through this prism.  Interestingly the courts draw a 
                                                 
28
 See further M Dooley, Fundamentals of Corporation Law (New 
York, The Foundation Press, 1995), 206–210. 
29
 [1974] AC 821, 835, 
30
 204 Mich. 459; 170 NW 668. 
31
 Id. P. 684. 
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rather stringent line in relation to altruistic behaviour when the company is insolvent and approaching liquidation.  In 
these cases the courts indicate that at this point in a company’s life it is too late for this kind of largesse, the point 
being that an insolvent company has nothing to gain and disbursement of funds should be curtailed so that as much 
as possible is available to creditors.32 The courts have long recognised that the imposition  of directors legal liability 
and duties are not amenable to application of broadly similar rules across the board.  The law allows for 
entrepreneurial and managerial behaviour.  It supports the concept of risk taking.  The rule in Smith (Howard) Ltd. V 
Ampol Petroleum Ltd.33 states that  “ it would be wrong for the court to substitute its opinion for that of the 
management, or indeed to question the correctness of the management’s decision…if bona fide arrived at.  There is 
no appeal on merits from management decisions to courts of law: nor will courts of law assume to act as a kind of 
supervisory board over decisions within the powers of management honestly arrived at.”  
In the US this approach has been characterised as the business judgement rule and is more highly articulated 
as it has become very significant in litigation regarding takeovers and mergers34  but it has always been important 
regarding a whole range of decisions by managers regarding corporate actions, such as those exemplified in Shlensky 
and indeed in Dodge. The standard for review of business decisions in the US is now contained in s.102(b)(7) of the 
Delaware Corporate Code which was enacted after the response to the court’s decision in Smith v Van Gorkom 35 
and requires that there must be “a showing of fraud, illegality or conflict of interest.” The legal framework which 
imposes a broadranging duty of care and loyalty on corporate managers also protects them from liability for mistaken 
decisions or decisions which might not always directly benefit the shareholder wealth maximisation principle as long 
as these decisions are made in good faith.  Thus in most cases shareholders cannot insist on short term profit 
maximisation at the expense of long term decisions which will benefit the company in different ways.  Decisions to 
support workers, communities, customers and so forth all come within this subset of decisions, they are unassailable 
in the corporate law paradigm and in fact are actually encouraged through many examples of judicial rhetoric, 
support for managerial discretion protects directors who want to act in socially responsible ways.   
                                                 
32
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However, there are limits to this rosy picture and this is particularly the case in a category of cases where 
employees interests as stakeholders directly conflict with the rights of shareholders as residual claimants and also 
with the rights of creditors.  These cases have a common strand and that is that they address this conflict in the 
context of insolvency or more broadly speaking in cases where corporate coffers are not flowing and the money is 
tight.  Thus in Parke v Daily News Ltd.36 the courts could not countenance ex gratia payments to employees, in the 
Irish case of Re Frederick Inns37, the courts could not allow funds from one company to be used to pay creditors of 
another.  In Yongstown Ohio the courts tried to grapple with the worst case scenario where a company removes itself 
from a community but could find no legal principles where it could restrain a company from doing so.  It is difficult 
to see how a court could cut across this fundamental principle which allows for capital mobility.38 
A theoretical limitation which clouds existing legal support for socially responsible managerial action 
emanates from the emphasis on capital market responsiveness. This will be considered below. Another  interesting 
area where the courts have again identified the importance of legal discourse in the CSR context is represented by the 
US case of Nike v Kasky regarding the ability of Nike Inc to engage in public debate regarding allegations made 
against it about its use of sweatshop labour.  Although settled, the judiciary were conscious of this important social 
activity and the dissenting judgement of Kennedy J. in noting the public interest in a public debate on corporate 
activity rightly identified the role of the courts in encouraging corporate involvement in this debate. Over all 
however, the Nike story isn’t good because it highlights how difficult it is for CSR alone to achieve desirable goals. 
Apart from cases on director’s duties which have been developed over time in many jurisdictions, different 
kinds of regulation has developed in recent years which has been derived from statutes.39  Under these statutes the 
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courts have also grappled with the standard of risk taking which they consider acceptable within the modern 
regulatory legislative framework exemplified by legislation providing for directors disqualification and restriction. 40  
This legislation introduced in all three jurisdictions  of UK, NI and RoI in the late 1980s and 1990 has received quite 
a bit of judicial attention. This legislation is particularly directed at the protection of non-shareholding stakeholders 
such as creditors and to some extent employees, although of course shareholders will also benefit from the standards 
imposed.  However a hypothesis proffered in this article is that even though rhetorically the legislation aspires to 
imposing higher standards of behaviour than those already imposed in the common law, the courts are still immersed 
in the culture of non interference and respect for risk taking. (Not entirely a bad thing!) The judgement of Peart J in 
Re USIT World plc41 is infused with respect for the exciting life of the entrepreneurial risktaker and the contribution 
he or she makes to our world. 
 “  A risk taken against such a background of planning and knowledge, and with appropriate advice taken, 
might be reasonably characterised as a calculated risk without any element of carelessness, rashness or recklessness 
attached to it which could attract the tag of irresponsibility.  Clearly the greater the amount of money involved in the 
risk the greater is the obligation on all concerned to ensure that appropriate care is taken in all aspects of its planning, 
so that all factors, reasonably foreseeable, which may cause the venture to fail, will be anticipated and guarded 
against. 
 
If an entrepreneur were to be obliged, on pain of being found irresponsible and of being restricted under the section, 
to avoid taking any decision which at some date in the future might be found to have risk attached to it, the business 
life and a large component of the economic driver of the economy of the State would stultify.  I do not believe that 
this is what the legislature had in mind when enacting section 150.” 
 
 
Conclusion 
All corporate regulation must be justified by reference to some developed corporate law theory regarding 
the function of the corporation, the role of its management and the role of shareholders.  Thus in Allen’s analysis 
some years ago of the debate between the European model and the US model of corporate governance concerning 
non-shareholding stakeholders he referred to the ‘managerialist’ conception of the corporation, a view of corporate 
function which is both more pragmatic and more predominant in reality than either the communitarian or 
contractarian approaches which he also describes.  The managerialist view is the theory which best fits what Allen 
                                                                                                                                                              
Judiciary’s Contribution to the Reform of Corporate Governance’ [2004] JCLS 225.  This is even more likely on this 
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describes as managerial practise in most corporations and the judiciary’s understanding of corporate function, both of 
which he had occasion to understand as Chancellor of the Delaware Court.42 The cases referred to in this section 
reflect this more pragmatic approach.  In the context of CSR the principle of shareholder primacy as distinct from 
shareholder wealth maximisation is the constraining principle.  Corporate law theorists have recognised that the 
current emphasis on short termism has threatened responsible corporate action.  Perhaps this is why we have had a 
concurrent growth in the CSR movement.  For example Laurence Mitchell has asked us whether Wealth is a Value43 
echoing the concerns expressed by Dworkin in the mid 80s as the law and economics school of thought reached an 
ascendancy in Chicago and beyond.44 Mitchell deplores the growth in corporate irresponsibility, particularly in the 
context of globalisation, and wonders whether from an ethical perspective wealth can be pursued as a free-standing 
value. David Millon has usefully distinguished shareholder primacy and shareholder wealth maximisation.45 The 
argument is that acceptance of orthodox corporate law theory which places shareholder primacy at the centre does 
not necessarily imply a slavish loyalty to shareholder wealth maximisation at all costs. This point must be 
emphasised in light of misunderstandings as to what is meant by shareholder primacy or shareholder value. In a 
commentary on Lawrence Mitchell’s Corporate Irresponsibility,46 Millon considers the issues identified by Mitchell 
surrounding current management practices in corporate America. In particular, the pressure felt by management to 
maximise shareholder profit, which Millon describes as “the SPM” goal, (shareholder profit maximisation) is 
considered. In his work the SPM goal is clearly separated out from other concepts that are central to our 
understanding of corporate function. Millon makes it clear that in his understanding of Mitchell’s work SPM can be 
“condemned without embracing a corporate social responsibility agenda . . .” which Millon views as being too 
radical. The importance of this point is quite simply that rejecting SPM is not necessarily a radical step or as radical a 
step, for example, as the adoption of a corporate responsibility theory which might well go so far as to require the 
acceptance of equal claims to corporate wealth for other constituencies such as employees, creditors, and community 
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interests in environmental welfare. Millon’s understanding of corporate social responsibility is perhaps overstated.  
What is important is the view that rejecting the current SPM modus operandi is or could be acceptable to a broad 
range of corporate law theorists. Thus, as we have seen the courts on both sides of the Atlantic have always tolerated 
a wide area of managerial discretion under some version of the business judgement rule.  Company law principles 
and the cases derived from these principles clearly illustrate that shareholder wealth maximisation is not a goal that 
must be pursued with short term ruthlessness and that, in fact, many management decisions, for example, relating to 
spending what would otherwise be distributable profits on advertising, political contributions, sporting and cultural 
events and philanthropic donations, have always been protected by the courts. As we have seen, even in the dark 
ages of the early nineteenth century it was recognised that some benefits, in this case, cakes and ale for the 
employees might bring benefits to the company in terms of performance incentives! The broad discretion given to 
management under fiduciary duty principles underlines the point similarly. In common law jurisdictions which have 
enacted “other stakeholder statutes”, it is clearly indicated that a slavish adherence to shareholder wealth 
maximisation is not required. In summary, therefore, these statutes, together with judicial pronouncements in 
common law jurisdictions in relation to managerial discretion, acknowledge that although orthodox corporate law 
theory continues to support shareholder primacy (shareholder value), shareholder wealth maximisation, particularly 
the ruthless pursuit of short-term shareholder wealth, is neither required nor necessarily desirable.  
Thus an alternative approach to corporate irresponsibility is presented in this article relying on two 
responses; 
 
First, a return to the realisation that the courts have always expected higher standards from managers beyond mere 
profit maximisation at all costs.  A consequent emphasis on judicial guidelines on the role of directors and further 
analysis of judicial thought in this area is important. 
 
Secondly an acceptance of the idea that the legislatures of jurisdictions in which most international companies reside, 
in addition to international institutions have a regulatory role to play in setting standards.   
Part III: Corporate Law Theory and Norm Scholarship. 
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Contemporaneously in the United States we have seen a growth in scholarship in the role of norms in 
corporate governance. As interest in norms grew in the arena of corporate law scholarship a distinction was made, 
pioneered by Rock and Wachter47 between legally enforceable company law rules and NLERS, non-legally 
enforceable rules and standards and whilst admitting the inelegance of NLERS they chose this term to clarify the 
voluntary nature of the norms with which we are concerned, representing a context where behaviour is adhered to 
through a privately enforced system of rewards and penalties.  They argue furthermore, athough not central to the 
points made here, that if enforcement includes even ‘a judicial backstop’48 the agreement in relation to certain kinds 
of behaviour is legally enforceable.  But nevertheless despite their claim regarding the presence of the ‘judicial 
backstop’ and the impact on whether a standard is legally enforceable or not, Rock and Wachter also claim that 
‘important parts of corporate law can be understood as establishing a structure within which nonlegally enforced 
self-governance can thrive.’ 49 On the whole the majority of corporate governance scholars recognise the connection 
between good behaviour towards stakeholders to whom no legal duty is owed, for example employees expecting 
Christmas gifts, communities expecting arts and cultural sponsorship and the fulfilment of the shareholder primacy 
obligation required in corporate law and the role the courts have placed in guiding the way.  That said much of the 
norm scholarship in the context of corporate governance focuses almost exclusively on the director-corporation-
shareholder relationship and on the facilitating role of corporate law in guiding good managerial behaviour towards 
shareholders.50 At least we can all agree with Rock and Wachter when they propose that ‘the structure of corporate 
law, whether embodied in statute or case law, is more fully understood if the effects of norm governance are included 
in the analysis.’   
The influence of norm scholarship. 
There are essentially two kinds of norms scholars. Firstly, there are those who identify norms as standards 
of behaviour which are not legally enforceable but which inform in some cases the exposition and articulation of 
legal standards.  This is a very apt analysis when we consider many decisions from a number of jurisdictions where 
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the courts have traditionally expounded and considered issues at the edge of corporate law pathology.51  The second 
kind of norm scholar is one who seeks a broader definition of non legally enforceable norms developed in more 
recent times. This kind of norm scholar seeks to embrace the CSR movement.  Here a school of thought puts forward 
the idea that norms will yield behaviour which is desirable but which it is argued law cannot and perhaps ought not 
deliver.  This is a more difficult proposition. 
The first kind of norm scholar will agree with the proposition that when one considers many judicial 
comments over the years, it is clear the courts have always embraced and understood that law will and can deliver 
very high standards of managerial behaviour.  Here norms which describe more fully principles of good faith, 
loyalty,52 risk taking which is not reasonable or honest, impose upon corporate directors and management broad 
ranging obligations not always easy to grasp for the ordinary business person but which are very familiar to 
corporate lawyers. The difficult question for norms scholars in about process, how exactly does this work and what 
do the judges think they are doing?  Having established the conceptual framework for asking the very important 
question as to what is going on when the courts attempt to deal with aspirational norms such as loyalty,  and good 
faith but back away from enforcing liability for possible infringement of the rules, Rock and Wachter fail to make 
sense of the answer.  They allow that the legal principle presents us with an undemanding standard of conduct, but 
also acknowledge that judges spend a lot of time considering these cases even though they, the judges, reiterate the 
business judgement rule as a jurisdictional boundary.53 In their explanation they end up treating as exceptions two 
US cases where directors were reprimanded.  Here however, it is argued that Rock and Wachter have reversed the 
analysis and laid the emphasis in the wrong place.  As stated in the previous section, the courts have always 
understood and protected the director who is not focussed on shareholder wealth maximisation, i.e. the director who 
acknowledges the primacy of the shareholder but also recognises the importance of other stakeholders.  The function 
of rules which protect managerial discretion allow directors to mediate in this way between competing claims.  The 
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function of the courts is to fill out the expansive nature of this protection and that is where the rhetoric contributes in 
an important way as Johnson mentioned. Shareholders wealth does not have to be attained at all costs. The only 
situation where the law will intervene to protect shareholders at all times is where the directors are themselves trying 
to benefit.54 
The second school of norms and what it has to do with the dark side of CSR. 
Broadly speaking CSR will consist of a body of non-legally enforceable norms of good behaviour, for 
example pro-active environmental actions, community activism and other kinds of actions which will deliver 
beneficial results.  However, it is clear that all CSR initiatives must be viewed within the currently understood 
paradigm of corporate function as expressed in corporate law and theory.  Therefore shareholder primacy will and 
must guide all norm driven behaviour. In this context it is useful to ask why any corporation which is not legally 
obliged to do so would embrace CSR in any of its guises.  The justifications must be inherent in our understanding of 
the purpose of the corporation, that is shareholder wealth creation.  The only way any CSR initiative can be justified 
is because it is financially beneficial to the company and consequently its shareholders. The benefit to the 
shareholders can be described in public relations terms broadly speaking.  This is not a cynical point.  Many 
companies involved in CSR will state that it is good to be viewed as a good corporate citizen, to get the accolade of 
one of the best companies to work for55 or to be known for example as a company which is involved in 
environmental protection initiatives,56 or to be known as a company which protects the integrity of its supply chain.57 
This point also recognises that if good corporate citizenship is a response to populist demands for corporate social 
responsibility well that is a good thing too, insofar as it goes. 
 However a more unsavoury aspect to the push to advance CSR is the argument that CSR is good for 
companies and shareholders because it keeps governments and regulators at bay.  CSR presents an attractive 
alternative to regulation.  Regulation and law is viewed as hostile to business interests, enforcing non-voluntary 
standards that corporations will not accept.  In a nutshell this is the part of CSR which prefers for example ‘family-
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friendly’ policies to hard-core regulation, the approach currently favoured in the United States to balancing work and 
family which is so different to the European approach. It is a movement, perhaps more gravely, which prefers 
voluntary environmental measures to the Kyoto agreement and which would prefer initiatives in relation to their own 
workers in developing countries rather than support implementation of ILO standards. What is most worrying is that 
CSR will be hijacked in this way by those who want to keep the regulators away, reflecting what Chomsky has 
described as the ‘American passion for de-regulation’ 58a passion which reached its zenith of achievement in the late 
1990s but perhaps is on the decline slightly since Sarbanes-Oxley59 was passed.  But here we find resonance with the 
rise in norm scholarship, with many norms scholars making such robust arguments for the facilitative role of 
company law that one can only conclude that the agenda is to resist further Federal or state regulation rather than 
explore the relationship between norms, corporate laws and good outcomes in any genuine way.  For example Coffee 
states that the idea that corporate behaviour ‘may be more shaped and determined by social norms than by legal rule 
seems to an idea whose time has come’. 60 This may well be true in a socially descriptive way but note that he does 
not shy away from the prescriptive position and goes on to state that commentators ‘have placed the relative efficacy 
of social norms as compared with legal rules at the centre of the debate over the judicial role in corporate law’ and 
also notes the arguments that perhaps the courts should be less rigorous because social norms adequately govern 
behaviour.  In testing these hypotheses out Coffee quite peculiarly identifies the Scandinavian countries as areas 
where norms seem to place an important role, but fails to acknowledge the equally if not more important fact of 
Scandinavian countries present a very highly regulated environment, particularly as regards the interests of non-
shareholding stakeholders. Norman Veasey similarly decries further attempts at Federal regulation as exemplified by 
Sarbanes Oxley and argues that norms have operated quite well against the backdrop of the common law, again 
seeming to advocate a hands off approach for the statutory regulators.  In conclusion of this part then two cautionary 
notes must be sounded.  The first is that nonlegally enforceable norms will not yield uniform responses to issues 
which matter to us.  Even though CSR can play a part in engaging in discourse with companies which might perceive 
an advantage in acting in a voluntary way, legal standards must articulate what is desirable for all. Law cannot it is 
argued be viewed as a minimum paving the way for responsible and socially altruistic behaviour, the function of law 
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is to yield high standards in its own right through high legislative standards, effective enforcement and penalties.  
The second is the danger that the CSR movement will be hijacked by those who favour voluntarism in a cynical way. 
Those who are descendants of the law and economics school of thought who see again a theoretical argument for 
resisting what they consider to be ‘big government.’ Both of these dangers are interrelated.  If CSR is used as a way 
of fending off ‘big’ government or if CSR is advocated as the only way a particular problem can be solved we will 
find ourselves stuck in a mindset where our failure to address problems will be regarded with considerable shock and 
dismay by future generations.   
Conclusion 
As indicated in the previous section directors and managers of corporations have experienced increased 
pressure to maximise shareholder wealth in a short term way. In turn this pressure has derived support and impetus 
from those in the corporate governance movement who placed such emphasis on capital markets theory as the most 
appropriate governance and monitoring device. We can now accept that despite theoretical assertions of the market 
as the most efficient of governance devices which dominated literature in the late 1980s and 1990s, these theoretical 
descriptions did not and do not account for flaws in how the market operates in reality. Recently, informational 
asymmetries, including not least, the failure of analysts to act independently of each other, and recent revelations in 
relation to the shortcomings of auditing practices61  clearly illustrate the discrepancies between market value of 
shares and actual corporate performance. All of these events tend to support those(including this author) who have 
argued that although markets do function reasonably accurately, particularly in relation to established companies, 
they are not transparent and are not without flaws. It is in fact these corporate scandals which have prompted a wider 
group of scholars beyond those who were never convinced about the capital markets theory in the first place, to 
revisit issues such as corporate responsibility, shareholder wealth maximisation and so forth.62  The DTI’s  
consideration of competing views of  corporate function concludes quite clearly (and correctly) that “shareholder 
value” is the primary principle which has been and will continue to be pursued by the company law regime.63 The 
shareholder value principle can be equated with shareholder primacy. Whilst embracing shareholder value or 
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shareholder primacy principles we can recognize that this does not imply a rejection of all stake holding claims and 
conversely recognition of the reality of stakeholders’ claims does not imply a negation of the central capitalist 
principle of shareholder value or primacy.  All that is required is a recognition of the possibility of balance and that 
government and regulation have a role in arriving at this balance. 
“ One underlying imperative exists and that is the acceptance that the corporation is indeed a public actor in relation to employee 
welfare issues. As such the corporation is subject to government regulation in pursuit of goals which may have little immediate 
effect on generating wealth for shareholders, but much to do with with striking a desirable balance between this goal and the 
broader concerns of government and society.”64 The resolution of this distinction allows for the embracing of a 
different understanding of corporate function which is more nuanced than a simple shareholder wealth maximisation 
model.  For example it will easily embrace the European Social Model of corporate governance which though clearly 
capitalist and shareholder driven also recognizes the importance of other stakeholders including employees and 
creditors, and the importance of locating the company within its societal context. Thus there is no contradiction 
between shareholder primacy and the Lisbon goal of regulating the corporation as one social element in achieving 
the goal of creating for the future “a dynamic knowledge based economy capable of sustainable economic growth 
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”65  Quite clearly this resolution will also allow us to 
contemplate a legitimate place for CSR, but  this will always be within the existing corporate law paradigm. . 
Finally, it is also important to emphasise that whilst traditional corporate law theory views the various non-
shareholding constituencies as being outside the remit of corporate law,  that does not by any means preclude an 
acceptance of the fact that these constituencies are entitled to protect their position or their entitlement to corporate 
wealth “either by the terms of their contracts with the corporation or by means of favourable regulatory legislation 
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obtained through the political process.”66 Reference to the political process raises interesting questions regarding the 
acceptance of the recognition of other stakeholders in the corporation. In conclusion, adherence to shareholder 
primacy (or shareholder value) does not require that shareholder wealth is maximised in the short-term to such an 
extent that the accordance of corporate benefits to the community in the form of philanthropic activities or the 
distribution of some element of corporate wealth to stakeholders, for example employees  have to be viewed 
continually against the demands of shareholder wealth maximisation, whether this is short-term or longterm or some 
odd and reflexive mixture of both. The costs entailed by giving benefits to employees do not have to be assessed 
crudely against shareholder wealth maximisation goals where certainly in the short-term view of wealth 
maximisation it will not make sense to be socially responsible. Good managers have always understood that 
distributing some share of corporate wealth to employees in terms of good working conditions and to the community 
in terms of involvement makes a lot of sense in terms of the long-term generation of wealth for the corporation and 
its shareholders. This view has been described67 as the “managerialist”   understanding of corporate activity, which 
reflects an understanding that knowledgeable and experienced corporate managers have always tried to behave with 
a balance in mind between profit generation and long-term planning. It is also clear that corporate law and corporate 
finance theory understand how good managers behave and that the courts have supported their discretionary actions 
for decades. 
Elsewhere this author  has written about resistance to employment regulation in the US and how strange this 
is from a European perspective.  What is most interesting  is the hostility to European style regulation disguised as 
academic argument, hostility which is given real and pragmatic expression in the US through lack of labour market 
regulation.68 Now we are faced with many moral and ethical challenges presented to us by the demands of corporate 
and capital mobility. Is CSR the only response available to us? It is hoped that this is not that case and that law will 
recover her dominion and deliver mandated enforceable standards, even at a minimum level across the globe. 
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